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MARTIN LODGE* and DEREK GILL**
This article explores the supposed shift from New Public Management
(NPM) to a new era of “post-NPM” by looking at one critical case, New
Zealand. It finds limited evidence of such a shift, suggesting that the wider
literature needs to move to a more careful methodological treatment of
empirical patterns. To contribute to such a move, this article applies a
three-pronged approach to the study of changing doctrines in executive
government. After setting out the broad contours of what NPM and post-
NPM supposedly constitute, the article proceeds to a documentary analysis
of State Services Commission doctrines; this is followed by an analysis of
“Public Service Bargains” based on elite interviews and finally a case-study
approach of the Crown Entities Act 2004. Far from a new era of adminis-
trative reform, the “messy” patterns that emerge suggest a continuation of
traditional understandings and ad hoc and politically driven adjustments,
leading to diversification.
After more than three decades of widespread currency, the term “New
Public Management” (NPM) does not seem to want to go away. For every
declaration that “NPM is dead,” another academic conference, edited
volume, or special issue is organized to reconsider administrative reform
trajectories, to “transcend” NPM, or to declare a move toward “post-
NPM” (Christensen and Laegreid 2008, Laegreid and Christensen 2001,
2007a, 2007b). What unites accounts of post-NPM (and related ideas) is a
diagnosis of the failures and shortcomings of earlier administrative
reform attempts (NPM) and the availability of new technological and
participatory tools to advance public management. But is NPM really
dead? What is the actual content of its supposed successor, post-NPM?
And to what extent is there any systematic evidence that would support
the argument of a shift from NPM to post-NPM?
This article explores the evidence for a shift from an age of “NPM” to an
age of “post-NPM” in the case of New Zealand. Looking at New Zealand
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should offer us maximum insights. New Zealand is regarded as the
primary example of an extensive and intellectually coherent attempt at
public sector reform that followed the key characteristics associated with
NPM (Boston et al. 1996; Hood 1990). Furthermore, a number of studies
on New Zealand have suggested a move away from NPM (Boston and
Eichbaum 2007; Norman 2003). Developments since the turn of the
century prompted Chapman and Duncan (2007) to pose the question: “Is
there a new New Zealand model?”
In contrast to these country-specific studies and those that argue more
broadly in favor of a shift toward post-NPM-type administrative reforms,
this article points to rather more diverse empirical and messy patterns.
These patterns suggest that NPM was never as purely implemented as the
literature has led us to believe, and post-NPM’s day is yet (if ever) to come.
Indeed, the New Zealand case suggests considerable continuity mixed
with ad hoc and politically motivated changes that have generated diver-
sification rather than a new era or paradigm.
More generally, this article warns against the adoption of ambiguous
terms without proper empirical foundations. It contributes to the wider
literature by utilizing three methodological devices to explore what, if
anything, has changed in thinking about core aspects of executive gov-
ernment in New Zealand over the last decade. First, we utilize the “admin-
istrative argument” device (Hood and Jackson 1991) to investigate the
extent of change in “machinery of government” (MoG) debates. Second,
we consider, through the concept of “Public Service Bargains” (PSBs),
how chief executives in ministerial departments perceive PSBs to have
changed over time. Third, we consider one critical case, namely, the Crown
Entities Act 2004. The election of November 2008, which returned the
National Party to office, provides the cutoff point for this analysis.
NPM, Post-NPM, and New Zealand
As with most divinities, defining NPM has been a problematic task (Hood
2005). At its most general, it is an eclectic set of doctrines that draw on, not
necessarily consistent, ideas from new institutional economics and mana-
gerialism. NPM was supposed to represent a move both “down grid” in the
sense of relaxing procedural rules as well as “down group” in the sense of
reducing the professional boundaries between public and private sectors.
This contrasts with the earlier age of “Progressive Public Administration”
(PPA) with an emphasis on procedural controls and rules and on public
sector distinctiveness (Hood 1994). More concretely, NPM-related reforms
were identified by “hands-on professional management,” explicit perfor-
mance standards, output controls, organizational disaggregation, compe-
tition and contractualization, private sector-style management practices,
and an emphasis on parsimony in financial resource use (Hood 1991, 4–5).
Dunleavy et al. (2005, 471) suggest that NPM was characterized by disag-
gregation, competition, and incentivization. Empirically, NPM has been
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associated with a wide variety of interventions, trajectories, and reform
intensities (Hood and Lodge 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, ch. 8).
If it is already difficult to define what NPM is, then the case of post-
NPM is even more problematic. As Christensen and Laegreid state:
“. . . post-NPM reforms—which partly revived some neo-Weberian
features—have been blended with some NPM features” (Christensen and
Laegreid 2008, 8; see also Dunleavy et al. 2005, 468). They diagnose a
reassertion of “old public administration” in the light of failures, absent
efficiency gains, and increased “insecurity” (Christensen and Laegreid
2008, 9) in a post-9/11 world. Similarly, Johan P. Olsen (2008) has pointed
to the inherent advantages of bureaucratic organization that have been
rediscovered after a period of marketization. Post-NPM is therefore
largely about overcoming the perceived NPM-generated weaknesses pro-
duced by specialization, fragmentation, and marketization. In response,
post-NPM is associated with a strengthening of coordination through
more centralized or collaborative capacity, whether it is called “whole of
government” or “joined-up government.” This emphasis on cooperation
and collaboration is achieved, for example, through centralization at the
center (Christensen and Laegreid (2008), through coordination within
networks of diverse actors (Stoker 2006), or through reintegration and
coordination using digital technology (Dunleavy et al. 2005).
In sum, post-NPM is said to signify a greater emphasis on “high grid”
(rules) and “high group” (collective public sector distinctiveness). Similar
suggestions are made by those authors who highlight that “public value”
offers a paradigmatic change from NPM: Observers stress the distinctive-
ness of the public sector and its multiple, often contradictory objectives
(O’Flynn 2007, 361; Stoker 2006, 416), the importance of network-based
collaborative public value generation, and the significance of outcome-
rather than output-based assessments (Alford and Hughes 2008; Alford
and O’Flynn 2009). In a similar vein, albeit mainly concerned with the
potential of transformative change through technology, Dunleavy et al.
(2005) argue that NPM “has essentially died in the water” (468) and
suggest that the emerging period of “Digital Era Governance” (DEG) is
characterized by three related features: “reintegration,” “needs-based
holistic structures,” and “digitalization” of administrative processes. The
latter is said to provide a transformation toward a new era of interaction
between government and its subjects.1
While representatives of the literatures on post-NPM, public value, and
DEG may disagree about some aspects, the basic tendencies of the type of
change away from NPM are similar (Wegrich 2010). The following utilizes
the “post-NPM” label to bring together the key themes that emerge from
the above literatures. Differences are largely one of emphasis. We choose
MoG questions, whereas public value is largely focused on the “delivery”
side of policymaking. DEG is about the potential effects of enthusiastic
uptakes of e-government solutions (which, in the case of New Zealand,
have been rather disappointing).
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These literatures also broadly agree on the causes of this supposedly
paradigmatic shift by pointing to a set of mechanisms that can be labeled
“disappointment,” “surprise,” and “technology.” “Disappointment” leads
to political pressure to “do something.” “Surprise” is linked to the idea
that particular sets of instruments have their own “black spots” and are
therefore unable to diagnose when things go wrong until it is too late
(Hood and Peters 2004). “Technology” is said to trigger a “neo-Weberian”
administration (Hood 1994) in that feasibility boundaries change and
organizational processes become redundant (such as typing pools) or can
be reviewed (e.g., online tax forms), thereby reducing the need for tradi-
tional “paper factories” in public administration (Dunleavy et al. 2006).
Table 1 brings together the ideas that have been associated with various
ages in public administration discussed above and notes the basic charac-
teristics of post-NPM (in particular the emphasis on the move back to “high
group/high grid”) in contrast to the previous ages of NPM and PPA.
In what follows, we explore the proclaimed shift from NPM to post-
NPM in one critical case, New Zealand. As noted, New Zealand’s public
sector reforms have been widely seen as cutting edge in terms of their
TABLE 1
Contrasting Key Themes across Three Administrative Reform Ages
Reform “Ages”
PPA NPM Post-NPM
Public sector
distinctiveness
(group
dimension)
Uniform/
inclusive
public service
Unbundling “Whole of
government”
Loosely defined
provision
Contractualization/
marketization
Return to mixed
pattern of in-house
and marketized
services; delivery
networks
Public sector
ethos/career
Private sector
style
Client based/holism
Rules versus
discretion (grid
dimension)
Policy skills Hands-on
management
skills
Boundary-spanning
skills
Implicit/
qualitative
performance
standards
Explicit
performance
standards
Joined-up targets
Procedural
controls
Output/outcome
controls
Procedural/
centralized
controls;
impartiality/ethics
rules
Note: Based on Hood (1994), Dunleavy et al. (2005), and Christensen and Laegreid (2008).
NPM, New Public Management; PPA, Progressive Public Administration.
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content and their extent (Aberbach and Christensen 2001; Boston 1987,
1992; Boston et al. 1996; Goldfinch 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).
Prominent examples include the contractual arrangements between
departmental chief executives and the State Services Commission (SSC;
thereby ending the idea of permanence), the adoption of an output/
outcome split in performance management, as well as the extensive dis-
aggregation of activities (including a split between “policy” and
“delivery”) in order to allow for “focus” and “specialization.”
New Zealand’s reform experience has been widely reviewed. The Schick
Report (Schick 1996) noted the extensive and coherent nature of the public
sector reforms. It also raised some of the concerns that were later picked up
in the post-NPM literatures, namely, the need for more central direction and
maintaining collaborative capacity in the light of government unbundling.
In response to these concerns and criticisms regarding standards of behav-
ior in the public sector, the “Review of the Centre” was commissioned by
the Labour government in 2001. This review advocated better integrated
service delivery, a rethinking of organizational fragmentation, and a strong
emphasis on people and organizational culture.2 As a result, New Zealand
is also said to be displaying “leading-edge” characteristics in terms of
post-NPM (Boston and Eichbaum 2007; Gregory 2003a; Norman and
Gregory 2003; Whitcombe 2008). Dunleavy et al. (2005, 471) suggest that
New Zealand’s initial reforms directly contributed to its poor relative
economic performance (until the election of the Labour government in
1999). They hail a working paper by the SSC, the central government
department tasked with civil service and MoG questions, that advocated
“whole of government” doctrines to combat “fragmentation” as highlight-
ing a move away from “NPM” (Bhatta 2003).3 Norman (2003, 19) describes
the incoming Labour government (of 1999) as “consisting of skeptics
and . . . opponents of NPM techniques.” Boston and Eichbaum (2007)
suggest that the 1999 Labour manifesto marked a distinct shift from “Phase
1” to “Phase 2” public management reform, underpinned by a “social
democratic” rather than a “neoliberal” philosophy.
Supporters of the reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s also note a
change away from the supposedly coherent and consistent basis in which
MoG questions were discussed and toward a far more politically “prag-
matic” line of justification (Scott 2001, 2008). Furthermore, the prior domi-
nance of the Treasury is said to have been challenged by politicians and
by other central agencies, in particular the SSC (Chapman and Duncan
2007). In the wider context, the change in the electoral rules of the game
from plurality to mixed-member proportional representation (MMP; 1996
was the first election under MMP) is said to have triggered a move from
“decisive” single-party government to the “muddling through” of multi-
party governments.
The case of New Zealand should therefore offer maximum insight into
the supposed shift from NPM to post-NPM and should facilitate a better
understanding of what the world of post-NPM might look like. In addi-
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tion, for those who regard New Zealand as a small, unimportant, and
overanalyzed case, this article contributes to wider debates regarding the
analysis of MoG reform through the application of three methodological
devices. We look at administrative arguments, followed by PSBs, before
moving to a case study of the Crown Entities Act of 2004. This focus is
wider than that usually provided in accounts pointing to “paradigmatic
change” in any single jurisdiction, but at the same time, we are conscious
that our focus is necessarily selective.
Changing Administrative Doctrines?
Nearly two decades ago, Christopher Hood and Michael Jackson (1991)
provided a first step toward an encyclopedia of administrative doctrines
(containing 99 doctrines covering key aspects of institutional design).
Building on our discussion in the previous section, Table 2 summarizes
key differences between NPM and post-NPM utilizing Hood and
Jackson’s (1991, 34) list.
Given the diagnosed changes in New Zealand, we should expect sig-
nificant differences in the observed argumentation patterns between NPM
TABLE 2
Comparing Administrative Reform Doctrines
NPM Post-NPM
A2—use independent public
bureaucracy
A1—use classic public bureaucracy
A3—use private/independent
organization
A2—use independent public
bureaucracy
H2.1—differentiated ranks with one
boss
H2.2—prefer differentiated ranks with
collegial directorate
J1.2—separate policy and
administration
J2—consolidate work
K2—managerial discretion K2—managerial discretion—but
within greater constraints
L1—give leaders best conditions L2—give leaders normal conditions
M2—multisource supply M2—multisource supply
N2—managerial/executive skills N1&2—technical skills to be able to
“span boundaries” and “managerial
skills”
O1—contracting out O1 & O2: in-house and contracted-out
provision
P2.2B—promotion on subjective merit P2.2A promotion on objective/
procedural judgment
R2.2.C—performance related pay R2.1 fixed pay
T2.1—fixed-term tenure T2 limit tenure
X2.3—control by business methods X2—control by process
X3.1—results orientation X3.2—outcome measures
Source: Hood and Jackson (1991, 34). We utilize their codes.
NPM, New Public Management.
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and post-NPM. We are interested in changing doctrines in MoG docu-
ments as put forward by the SSC before and after 1999. We concentrate on
the SSC as it is more flexible in its programmatic foundations than the
other key public reform actor, the New Zealand Treasury. We seek to
maximize the observed change in argumentation by focusing on the SSC.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we look at the overall prin-
ciples that the SSC proposed to apply to MoG reviews across all sectors.
Second, we analyze a range of policy recommendations that applied MoG
principles to particular domains. Third, we consider the administra-
tive doctrines as put forward in SSC briefing documents to incoming
ministers.
We used the SSC’s Web site for recent (post-2002) documents on MoG
questions. We relied on the SSC to provide documents for the period before
2002 that relate to advice regarding MoG questions (i.e., those not available
on the Web site). These documents provide a valid indicator of overall
MoG-related discussions during the period of interest. We independently
analyzed the documents and recorded separately what we regarded as the
key claims in these documents and then moderated and coded them
according to the frame provided by Hood and Jackson (1991, 35).
Turning to the overall MoG principles first, Table 3 provides for an
overview of the SSC’s underlying MoG principles and their associated
administrative doctrines (using the codes provided by Hood and Jackson
1991). The SSC has undertaken a review of general MoG principles at least
once a decade. In 1987 and 1998, such reviews involved the commission-
ing of papers from inside and outside the SSC as well as active engage-
ment with the Treasury.
Table 3 suggests that the principles are oriented at different MoG
dimensions, but they point to similarities across time, although mixed
with a degree of reduced specificity in overall message. The 1987 prin-
ciples start with the fundamental question as to where a function should
be undertaken (the “scope of government” principle: inside or outside
government). They then deal with questions as to what kind of (govern-
ment) organization should manage particular functions (“decision-
making principles”) and finally move to organizational design questions
(which functions should be separated and which should be colocated). The
1998 principles are solely interested at the decision-making level. The 2007
material starts with the scope of government question but thereafter
closely follows the 1998 principles. To some extent, these changes appear
consistent with an NPM/post-NPM story. The 1987 principles placed
greater emphasis on focus and specialization with a preference for sepa-
ration of policy and service delivery. In 1998, reflecting experience of over
a decade of reform, these themes continued to persist but were presented
in a more nuanced tone: “[C]ontestability is better, sometimes; functional
separation: sometimes yes, sometimes maybe.”
Table 2 noted that one key distinction between NPM and post-NPM
concerns the use of “independent bureaucracy.” The New Zealand case
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distinguishes between noncommercial functions and commercial trading
activities. There has been no change in SSC thinking regarding commer-
cial activities since 1987: Commercial activities are to be provided within
commercial structures.4 For example, among the decisions included in the
Crown Entities Act 2004 was the reorganization of three “crown entity
TABLE 3
Overview of MoG Principles over Time
1987 Cabinet MoG
Principles 1998 MoG Principles 2007 MoG Questions
Ensuring the state does
not do what others
can do better (A3)
Effectiveness and efficiency
principle
What role for central
government?
(A1&3)
Clarifying departmental
policy objectives and
functions (X3)
Contestable is better,
sometimes (O1/O2)
What functions to
carry out that role?
(J1/V2)
Placing commercial
function in
commercial structures
(A3.1)
Function separation—
“sometimes yes, sometime
maybe” (J1)
What powers to carry
out functions?
Separation of conflicting
objectives (V1)
Multiple functions means
department (V2)
What funding? (M1/
M2)
Separation where
practical of policy
advice and service
delivery (J1.2)
Match commercial to
commercial (A3.1)
What risk from
functions and
powers—strategic,
political, fiscal,
contractual?
Selection of appropriate
structures and
management
frameworks
Managing risk—departmental
form is preferred (A1)
when strategic risk is high
What governance—
what kind of
ministerial
involvement (A1)
Placement of function
that need to be
performed close to
ministers (e.g., policy
advice) in
departments rather
than Crown Entities or
SOEs (J1)
(SSC 2007b, 6)
(Minister of State Services
1998, para. 7)
Contractibility is low
Flexibility (where the choice
is not clear cut)
Constitutional conventions
Close ministerial oversight
favors departments (A1)
Need for independence
favors nondepartmental
forms (A2/A3)
(SSC 2007b, 6)
MoG, machinery of government.
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companies” into “companies under the State-Owned Enterprises Act”
because they undertook commercial functions. In contrast, for noncom-
mercial functions, the overall MoG principles display a degree of soften-
ing, namely, a move away from a presumption of separation in 1987 to a
“sometimes yes, sometimes maybe” principle in 1998 and 2007.5
Turning to advice in particular domains, Table 4 suggests that the pre-
1999 period was characterized by considerable consistency, whereas the
post-1999 period was distinguished by greater diversity. Table 4 provides
for important insights. One is that in the decade to 2008 there are no
consistent shifts in doctrines. Even those documents that point to the
limits of the reforms of the 1980s do not make claims that could be
interpreted either to be of the “one more heave” kind that demands
“purer” NPM-type reforms or rejections of earlier doctrinal ideas in the
direction of post-NPM. The available documents suggest neither a “pure
world” of NPM pre-1999 nor a straightforward shift toward a post-NPM
(post-1999). Individual documents provide evidence of the SSC’s position
morphing, but overall there is no clear-cut pattern. Similarly, in terms
of justification, despite more use of the concept of “capability” (a
“resilience”-type justification), an emphasis on “value for money” (i.e.,
“efficiency”) was dominant throughout.
Finally, we extended the documentary analysis to SSC briefing papers to
incoming ministers. The 2002 Briefing to the Minister of State Services
arguably reflects the high point of post-NPM-related thinking with its
emphasis on “integrated delivery” and the need to “address fragmenta-
tion” and to encourage a “more long-term focus” as well as outcome
specification (SSC 2002). Subsequent briefing documents repeat some of
these themes. For example, the October 2005 postelection briefing empha-
sizes the importance of “learning cultures,” “good conduct,” “networked
services,” and “managing for outcomes” (SSC 2005a). However, in the 2007
briefing for the new minister, one of the key objectives (that of “excellent
state servants”) had been replaced by “value for money state services” (SSC
2007a). In other words, the broad intention and objectives that supposedly
guided the SSC were hardly of a nature that would justify sweeping
statements regarding the sustained rise of post-NPM. Documents did
reflect a growing emphasis on reduced fragmentation and closer “control”
as well as procedural correctness. Nevertheless, the continued emphasis on
efficiency points to a similar phenomenon that is evident in Table 4: We did
not find a single set of doctrines and justifications that were being applied
to the state sector in New Zealand, nor were we able to identify a significant
shift in doctrines and justifications over time.
In sum, a discussion that concentrates solely on identifying what is
NPM and what is post-NPM cannot account for the variability of advice
put forward by the SSC. While there are shifts in focus, it is difficult to
discover any form of major shift in SSC argumentation. Instead, the pat-
terns point to differentiated and diversified applications of administrative
arguments.
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Changing PSBs?
PSBs are defined as the explicit and implicit rules and understandings
regarding duties and expectations between public servants and the wider
political system (Hood and Lodge 2006, 6). In this section, the focus is on
the PSB as applied to top bureaucrats, the chief executives, in ministerial
departments. We explore PSB-related questions in terms of rewards (who
gets what, when, and how), competency (what skills and competencies are
expected), and loyalty (to whom or what are public servants loyal).
Looking at these key dimensions of any PSB for top bureaucrats, some
key features in terms of the age of NPM and the age of post-NPM stand
out. The key differences lie in the competency dimension: Whereas an
NPM-type PSB emphasizes the importance of “delivery” within any one
organization (justified by the idea of “focus” and “specialization”), the
underlying competency ideas represented in the post-NPM literatures
stress the importance of boundary spanning and collaboration. Public
services are said to require complex solutions to complex problems by
drawing on the offerings of highly complex and quickly developing tech-
nologies. Therefore, competency becomes the knowledge to access and
bring together expertise. Similarly, in terms of loyalty, the argument of a
“re-Weberianization” of public administration has been advanced. A
growing emphasis on “ethics” and “rules” is said to have replaced an
NPM emphasis on “setting managers free to manage.” Finally, in terms of
reward, post-NPM is expected to lead to a reduction in the extent to which
performance pay is provided overall and in the way it is being distributed,
in particular moving away from individualized to more team-based incen-
tive systems. The key PSB aspects are summarized in Table 5.
The empirical evidence for this section builds primarily on a series of
interviews (n = 22) with present and former public servants and other key
TABLE 5
Changing Emphases in Public Service Bargains
NPM-Age PSB Post-NPM-Age PSB
Reward Emphasis on rivalry,
individualized
performance pay
Pullback of “hard edges” of
performance pay, emphasis on
collaboration/team-based incentives
Competency Emphasis on delivery
and getting things
done
Emphasis on boundary spanning as
part of “whole of government”
activities, ability to understand and
procure intelligent technical systems
for “joined-up” solutions
Loyalty Executing set targets/
agreements within
discretionary space
Codification of rules/ethics,
strengthening emphasis on
“judge-type” character of public
service
NPM, New Public Management; PSB, Public Service Bargains.
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political participants and observers of the PSB that one of the authors
conducted in Wellington between November and December 2008.6 These
interviews were conducted under “Chatham House” rules (i.e., nonattrib-
utability). Interviewees were selected on the basis of their representative-
ness for particular aspects of the PSB, allowing for insights from policy
and operational administrative units, as well as from different “genera-
tions” of chief executives and others.
A seminal characterization of the PSB that traditionally applied to
senior public servants in New Zealand (under the 1912 Public Service Act)
states:
With the political parties the modern [New Zealand] civil service has struck a
mutually beneficial bargain. By guaranteeing to public servants a life’s career
and a pension, parties have foresworn the use of patronage and have guaranteed
to the state’s employees their tenure of their jobs. In return the parties expect,
and the public servants owe, equal loyalty to any government which the people
have placed in office. (Lipson 1948, 479)
The 1988 State Sector Act (especially in combination with the 1989
Public Finance Act) introduced core changes to the traditional PSB (as
noted above) for public servants in ministerial departments generally and
chief executives in particular.7 One departure was the end of the career
model and the introduction of higher and more flexible pay for specific
positions in exchange for “performance” as evaluated by the State Services
Commissioner. Related, more explicit competency demands were added
to emphasize bureaucratic responsiveness: Chief executives were respon-
sible for delivering on explicit performance expectations (and in doing so
were freed from the Public Service Manual and other input controls). The
separation between primarily policy departments and operational agen-
cies was to facilitate a “specialization” effect between those chief execu-
tives (and their departments) concentrating on “policy advice” and those
focusing on “service delivery and regulation.”
Loyalty, in contrast, remained “serial”: Chief executives were to serve
loyally the government of the day. Chief executive appointment and per-
formance review processes were conducted by the State Services Commis-
sioner on behalf of ministers. Thus, far from being a “managerial”
relationship in which ministers set performance targets and managers
were directed to achieve them, the relationship in New Zealand involved
a ménage-à-trois in which one party had a statutory trustee position in
safeguarding PSBs. There has been no demand for the “politicization” of
appointments. Indeed, the State Services Commissioner has been
appointed to conduct the selection of chief executives of departments
outside the public service including the NZ Defence Forces and other
security agencies. The removal in 2000 of the so-called “face does not fit”
clause in chief executive performance agreements, which previously had
allowed ministers to ask for a removal of a chief executive, required the
State Service Commissioner to perform some fancy footwork between the
different parties in case of irreconcilable differences.
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In other words, in the late 1980s New Zealand moved to something
resembling the ideal-type NPM-type PSB as outlined above. Performance
was supposedly incentivized through a significant performance element
as part of total remuneration and the end of tenure, and through an
increased focus on organizational performance rather than policy advice.
However, the continued strong emphasis on protecting serial loyalty pro-
vided an important counterbalance to the idea of a “pure” NPM-type PSB.
But how did this PSB perform over the following two decades?
On the reward dimension, the key aspect of the post-1988 PSB, namely,
that security had been exchanged for private sector-type salaries, was
never fulfilled. Although salary levels remained “comfortable,” the link
between private sector chief executive pay and chief executive pay was
never achieved. This led, in 1997, to a change in official policy, namely, that
salaries were to follow that of chief executives in the wider public sector
(SSC 1997a). Subsequently, salaries climbed steadily, in particular for the
“bigger” departments, leaving behind “smaller” departments with less
than 50 staff such as Women’s Affairs and Pacific & Island Affairs. This
marked to some extent a departure from earlier conventions of chief
executive pay being relatively tightly clustered (see Gregory 2003b). Some
interviewees even suggested pay levels (and performance payments) were
not significant motivators: “I can remember one chief executive saying that
he did not want more money” (I14/11).
The performance management aspect of the reward side of the PSB
remained difficult to operate (see Lonti and Gregory 2007). One change
that broadly followed the expectations of a move to a post-NPM age
was increased talk about the importance of incentivizing outcomes and
not merely outputs (that were accused of generating a silo mentality).
These demands were reflected in the dropping of formal “performance
agreements” between ministers and chief executives, the move from
hard-edged contractualism of purchase agreements to softer-edged
relationships involved in output plans, as well as the introduction of
“Statements of Intent.” This represented a change in the PSB for chief
executives (see Baehler 2003) but maintained the NPM-related emphasis
on outputs/outcomes established by the Public Finance Act 1989.8
Observers noted that attempts at measuring outcomes failed to get
traction (Gill 2008), and some interviewees bemoaned the continued reli-
ance on output measures. The SSC performance evaluations downplayed
ex post performance reporting and increased the emphasis on feedback
from 10 to 20 internal and external “stakeholders” to complement the
minister’s views. Nevertheless, the relationship with the minister
remained central: “[T]hey get 10–20 references, what matters is the view of
the minister” (I14/11); “you either have the confidence of the minister or
not” (I12/12a). One chief executive suggested that “if you make one big
mistake, but [otherwise] performed beautifully and did something really
innovative, you’d still end up without your bonus” (I14/11), while a
further chief executive noted: “[I]f you perform, you get a certain amount.
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If you perform exceptionally, you get a little bit more. If you perform badly,
you get a little bit less. But it really doesn’t make a difference” (I12/12b).
Another chief executive argued that the output specifications were mean-
ingless because of an inability to control any of the inputs that affected the
organization (I16/12). In addition to the widely held view that the effects
of performance pay and the end to tenure had hardly impacted on behav-
ior, one interviewee pointed to the administrative difficulty of devising
outcome-oriented performance indicators. The continued reliance on an
output-oriented system “means if you don’t do what it is I want you to do,
I can do something about you” but also provided for a “kind of straight-
line accountability stuff that doesn’t work” and prevented “whole of
government” outcomes (I12/12a).
In short, salaries had increased to reflect greater output-related risks,
but the system had neither moved toward a fully blown NPM-type reward
understanding of substantial variable pay at a significant level nor moved
toward the post-NPM themes of incentivizing outcomes and collaboration
despite some official announcements.
On the competency side, the demand, since the early 2000s, for
increased attention toward “whole of government” collaborative work
could be interpreted as a shift toward post-NPM. Demands for boundary-
spanning capacity were not only reflected in the typical justification that
“increased policy complexity” but also required a move beyond a “silo
mentality.” More widely, it could be seen as a result of the demands of
coalition government (namely, understanding and supporting the negoti-
ated solutions among politicians). Furthermore, the incoming Labour gov-
ernment of 1999 suspected an incapability, especially among Treasury
staff, to adjust advice to the preferences of a center-left party. It also
accused public servants of showing too little creativity in illustrating how
options could be made to work rather than in developing “all reasons you
shouldn’t do it” (I2/12a). At the same time, public servants bemoaned a
lack of willingness among politicians to rely on their expert and sage
advice. In contrast, others accused top bureaucrats for having too keenly
accommodated their political “masters” in terms of delivering too politi-
cally attuned advice, thereby compromising on their capacity to act as
“free and frank” policy advisors and reality checkers (I2/12c; I24/11;
I2/12b).
The “sage” competency to advise on policy strategies remained at the
heart of competency understandings, and it was the problem of how to
“measure” policy advice that was also at the heart of a series of working
groups (Gregory and Lonti 2008). One former chief executive suggested a
key competency was to brief the minister during the (three-floor) lift
journey from the ministerial to the prime ministerial office (I17/11) in
Parliament (the “Beehive”). Equally, others saw their primary role as being
a “sage,” namely, to be aware of political context and to be able to engage
ministers with their department’s advice (I14/11). Such abilities were also
emphasized by those working within “operational departments.” Here,
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one of the key problems diagnosed was that certain chief executives had
either lacked or misunderstood the implicit but required “sage” compe-
tencies, focusing more on their official competency requirements as
“deliverers,” for example, of child protection. As one chief executive
noted, “you take a lot of risk, and it’s not the risk on your performance, it’s
the rest of the stuff [the managing of the political context], which is where
ending up stressed comes from” (I12/12a).
And even those who suggested that collaboration had become more
important pointed to these ideas’ modest success: “[T]he focus of the last
decade has been co-ordination, co-operation and collaboration . . . I liken
that to learning to play nicely in the sandpit together . . . not kick sand in
each other’s eyes . . . [now we need to] not play nicely but [learn to] play
together” (I2/12). In other words, as in the case of the reward dimension,
the competency dimension of the PSB was sharpened at the edges, first of
all with a growing emphasis on “delivering outputs” (thereby following
an NPM-type PSB), but what remained at the heart of competency
requirements was the traditional top bureaucratic competency of being a
sage, even with the increase in political advisor numbers (Eichbaum and
Shaw 2007a, 2007b). Thus, the shift from the widely hailed “output pro-
duction” to a collaborative “outcome management” was only limited.
Finally, in terms of loyalty, developments from an NPM to a post-NPM
bargain would be indicated by a move from an “executive” understanding
in which public servants were given a zone of discretion to perform to an
increasingly codified relationship between politics and administration.
Again, the developments over the past decade and a half were somewhat
more complex. For one, policy-oriented departments in particular contin-
ued to rely on a considerable “partner” component in the PSB (an
exchange relationship between the civil servant’s right to be heard and
trusted for the politician’s right to expect not to be politically embarrassed
or surprised). It was this partner role that was said to have become increas-
ingly under challenge. One former chief executive put it like this: “[I]f they
think you are going to say something they don’t want, they make sure that
you’re not in the room” (I4/12).
Following more than a decade of Treasury dominance, the incoming
Labour government of 1999 sought to make an explicit break with the past
decade. Politicians dismissed the quality of advice they had received from
the civil service and enhanced policy and political advice functions were
situated in ministerial offices. One key example of a powerful political
advisor was the former Labour prime minister’s chief of staff, Heather
Simpson. Others saw political advisors as potentially helpful; they were
seen as a result of a functional differentiation that required “political
servants” to undertake the explicitly political coalition negotiations that an
“apolitical” public service could not pursue (I25/11; see also Eichbaum
and Shaw 2007a, 2007b, who point to largely positive appreciation of the
role of political advisors). In addition, the potential consequences of
freedom of information under the 1982 Official Information Act meant that
TOWARD A NEW ERA OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM? 155
politicians were widely accused of refusing “free and frank” advice that
could embarrass them in the media headlights at a later time: “[T]hey did
not want to see a Cabinet paper with which they did not agree” (I4/12).
While therefore some chief executives saw their main role as providing
their minister with strategic “free and frank” advice and being in a
“partner” role, others saw a change in their role toward an executive-type
“do as you are told” understanding: “[T]hey expect obedience” (I25/11).
It was, however, not just the presumed partner role that was under
strain but also the (NPM-related) “executive” understanding that politi-
cians would grant their chief executives discretion to deliver outputs.
Concepts drawn from agency theory of contractualized relations proved
overcomplex, insufficiently adaptable, and unenforceable: “[I]f I had gone,
told my Minister that I was about to sue the head of one of our agencies for
non-performance of their contract, I would have rapidly found that I was
on my own and I’d be renegotiating my own [contract]” (I4/12). Further-
more, the other prerequisite of an executive-type understanding of
loyalty—being provided with the sufficient resources to deliver the
requested outputs—was also said to have come under strain with politi-
cians being accused of rejecting advice on the potential implications of
resource constraints. Subsequent publicized failures and further inquiries
into departmental “misconduct” led to chief executives falling on their
sword as no “smoking gun” evidence was produced. Finally, delivering
well on agreed outputs was hardly a guarantee for continued employ-
ment, especially if “the face didn’t fit.”9
The menage-à-trois arrangement also witnessed considerable strain. In
particular, it was argued that the SSC had not upheld its trustee role.
Instead, the SSC was accused of too quickly following ministerial calls for
an “inquiry” and thereby showing insufficient backbone to stand up to
ministerial demands for sackings. This led some to suggest that chief
executives were being cheated: “because a number of CEs were held up
and publicly given a telling off and then resigned for things that weren’t
100 per cent clear from outside that it had been their fault” (I12/12).
Others, however, pointed to the inherent problems in operating such an
arrangement per se, thereby questioning whether the SSC could positively
contribute to solving issues in the relationship between ministers and
chief executives: “having the SSC come in is like having a marriage coun-
selor in the bedroom, it takes away the magic” (I17/11).
Therefore, the different loyalty understandings, namely, those of being
a “partner” to the minister and that of being an “executive” to deliver on
agreed outputs that became more prominent after 1988, were under con-
siderable strain. However, they were not under the sort of strain or dis-
played the sort of dynamic that would be predicted by those diagnosing
the rise of post-NPM. If these two trends are solely about the thickening of
ethics and procedural guidelines, then despite some attempts by the SSC
(in 2004 its mandate was extended to include integrity and conduct
beyond the public service department to include most of the wider state
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sector), no “thickening” of the rules occurred regarding the minister–chief
executive relationship.10 Instead, developments displayed a highly vulner-
able set of understandings with considerable scope for cheating.
In sum, it is difficult to diagnose a uniform trend in the PSBs that applied
to chief executives. Some of the initial reforms under the 1988 Act followed
the idea of an NPM-type PSB, in particular, in terms of competency and
reward. However, the trustee role of the SSC and the strong emphasis
placed on “serial loyalism” point to strong countervailing forces. In later
stages, all three PSB dimensions—reward, competency, and loyalty—came
under strain, none of which clearly following the trajectory diagnosed by
advocates of post-NPM despite some rhetorical commitment to greater
outcome reward orientation and boundary-spanning/collaborative com-
petency. In the loyalty aspect in particular, there was little to suggest that
earlier attempts at codification or commitment to “serial loyalism” had any
impact. Indeed, developments occurred usually as the result of ad hoc
responses to “political heat,” convenience, and blame avoidance (“[chief
executives] are paid a shit load of money, so they can bloody start to earn the
money,” I2/12) rather than the consistent application of a set of doctrines.
The inherent tensions within the PSB were more likely to cause friction and
developments than the force of post-NPM-related ideas.
Changing Doctrines? The Crown Entities Act 2004
Finally, we turn to the Crown Entities Act 2004.11 The Crown Entities Bill
was introduced as part of an omnibus public management amendment bill
that also included changes in the State Sector Act and the Public Finance
Act.12 For Boston and Eichbaum (2007, 162), the legislative package includ-
ing this Act represented a key indicator of a wider shift in administrative
reform doctrines, namely, toward a post-NPM Phase 2 of reform that had
come about from the “rupture” of the election victory of the Labour
government in 1999. Indeed, the introduction of a unified umbrella gov-
ernance and accountability statute for arm’s-length public bodies, created
by NPM “fragmentation,” would seem to fit the bill for a post-NPM
development. This section probes deeper into the process of Crown Enti-
ties Reform; it asks whether the diagnosed problems were related to
continued problems that previous (NPM) reforms were supposed to have
solved or whether the problems were associated with previous reforms
directly. In addition, this section asks whether the applied solutions were
directly influenced by post-NPM doctrines.
Nonministerial or indirect administration had been a long-standing
feature of New Zealand public administration, as it is in most OECD
countries. Together with the various entities that had been created as part
of the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s (40% of Crown Entities
were established in the reforms after the 1984 election), this created the
perception of a cumbersome and confusing plethora of organizations that
had been established in an ad hoc fashion. Apart from statutory and legal
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standing and listing under the Public Finance Act (the notion of Crown
Entity was a creature of accrual accounting requirements), Crown Entities
displayed considerable diversity in terms of functions, size, forms, and
powers. In addition, incidents throughout the 1990s focused political
attention on these Crown Entities.13 These incidents offered convenient
reference points for the incoming Labour-led government to state their
intentions to provide for a different approach toward MoG questions.14
The incoming minority Labour/Alliance coalition government (of
1999) identified a reduction in fragmentation as one of a handful of stra-
tegic priorities for the first term. Following the 2001 Review of the Centre,
which advocated, as noted, an overall review of governance arrange-
ments, the government introduced an omnibus legislative package, which
included the Crown Entities Act and amended the Public Finance Act and
the State Sector Act. Indeed, the SSC’s 2002 “Briefing to the Minister for
State Services” included “Priority III: Resolve Crown Entity Governance”
(22–23). The long title of the omnibus bill emphasized raising standards of
ethics and integrity, increased coordination, and reduced fragmentation.
All these themes are consistent with post-NPM.
However, the emergence of the Crown Entities Act reflects more
complex origins that do not fit easily into the post-NPM category. First of
all, it is difficult to suggest that the diagnosed problems of a proliferation
of “arm’s-length” government bodies were a direct result of the reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s. The New Zealand state sector had, since at least the
Second World War, been largely characterized by arm’s-length govern-
ment. By 1984, only 24% of public employees operated within departments
of the public service. In other words, far from being a theme of the NPM
age, the steady move toward arm’s-length government and away from a
unified public service was long standing and well under way before the
reforms of the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decision to introduce the Crown Entity legislation to
clarify the locus of control at the organizational level and the proposed
classification of individual entities under that legislation was announced
in November 1998 by the then National Party Minister of State Services.
The proposed reforms were defined as “system incompleteness” and
“unfinished business” at the time—in many ways they were a set of
solutions waiting for the proverbial “window” to open. The core features
of the legislation were all well developed prior to Labour taking office and
were presented to Cabinet for approval within the first year in office. The
subsequent Review of the Centre resulted in the addition of a “whole of
government” power to “direct” groups of Crown Entities, but the overall
changes reinforced the locus of control at the individual organizational
level.
Moreover, the granting of ministerial power to direct Crown Entities
reflected long-standing tensions between demands for ministerial over-
sight and demands for granting a degree of autonomy to arm’s-length
bodies. This tension was resolved by defining the minister’s role in the
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development of organizational “statements of intent” and constraining the
power of ministers to direct individual entities. Following the “Review of
the Centre,” the initial bill introduced a “whole of government” power to
“direct” that applied to classes of crown entities but not to individual
entities. On the surface, this could be seen as compatible with post-NPM-
related ideas. However, the key motivation was not to compensate for the
perception of an overfragmented state. Instead, this power was included
to accommodate the political desire to be able to shape individual
organizations.15
Finally, the ethics dimension of the legislation reveals a more complex
set of motivations than post-NPM-type accounts would allow for. Post-
NPM accounts stress the role of thickened procedural and ethical guid-
ance in appointment matters in order to reduce the risk of patronage. On
the one hand, the legislative package accompanying the Crown Entities
Act did include an extension of the mandate of the State Services Com-
missioner to set standards for almost all employees in the wider state
sector through a code of conduct. On the other, the concern with improv-
ing standards did not extend to board appointments. Appointment to
government boards has long been the last bastion of patronage in New
Zealand public administration, and this predates the reforms of the 1980
and 1990s. Despite receiving advice to introduce the “merit” requirement
for board appointment, this criterion was watered down by the Cabinet to
“appropriate knowledge, skills and experience.” This was interpreted as
granting ministers wider discretion to allow for the appointment of “our”
people with appropriate political connections and understandings.
In short, the Crown Entities Act was neither a response to problems
generated by NPM nor a result of an application of solutions influenced by
post-NPM-type ideas. Rather, it was the New Zealand response to the
enduring problem of arm’s-length government that predates NPM-related
public sector reform across OECD governments (Gill 2002). The Crown
Entities Act can therefore best be seen as an attempt to deal with long-term
issues and a case of “unfinished business.” It emerged as a response to
long-standing concerns in New Zealand central government rather than
as a response to side effects generated by NPM-type reforms. When
looking at the key choices that characterized the Act, it is difficult to find
any straightforward application of administrative doctrines that were
guided by post-NPM-related ideas. More broadly, the argument that the
age of post-NPM has witnessed reduced fragmentation needs to be quali-
fied. Despite the rhetoric about reduced fragmentation, there has been no
significant reduction in the number of state sector bodies in New Zealand
(Gill 2006).
Conclusion
This article has advanced three issues. First, it has contributed to the
debate regarding the study of administrative reform themes by offering a
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multimethodological perspective. Second, it has contributed to the litera-
ture on changing fashions in the practice and rhetoric of administrative
reform. Third, it has contributed to the wider understanding of ongoing
developments in New Zealand, a case that continues to attract consider-
able attention as a reform “outlier.” In this conclusion, we deal with each
of these points in reverse order.
First, the New Zealand story suggests that the argument of a diagnosed
mega-trend, from NPM to post-NPM, is difficult to sustain. Across all
three sections, considerable evidence suggests an entrenchment of ideas
that were initially formalized in the late 1980s. Indeed, the supposedly
NPM-related reforms were far more diverse and varied than is often
stereotyped—especially when looking at the way in which PSBs were
“lived” in the perceptions of high bureaucrats and other actors. For
example, the continued importance of serial loyalism for chief executives
(despite the end of tenure) was something that is not widely associated
with the NPM literature. The reforms that have been widely associated
with post-NPM point to long-standing concerns in executive government
rather than problems generated by NPM alone; in other words, rather than
“pendulum swings,” we are observing a process of “layering” (as high-
lighted in the institutional literature) that is driven by more varied pro-
cesses than solely that of disappointment generated by NPM.
As noted, the diverse arguments put forward by the SSC, the events
that led to changed understandings across PSBs, as well as the ideas
underpinning the Crown Entities Act 2004 did not constitute a reversal of
earlier reforms; rather, they built on existing reforms and moderated and
diversified particular aspects of these reforms, leading to a more complex
and diversified MoG that hardly constituted a “paradigm.” In other
words, the extent of change in New Zealand has been one of degree, not
one of shifting paradigms. Despite the claims of a new post-NPM para-
digm (and its “public value” and DEG relatives), no one set of coherent
and consistent administrative doctrines reigns in New Zealand. Even the
age of NPM appears more diverse than often allowed (especially when
viewed through the lens of PSBs), and the trend in the 2000s has most
certainly been one of diversification. The diagnosis of diversification is one
that is shared by other comparative studies on developments in executive
government: Hood and Lodge (2006, ch. 10) similarly diagnosed a trend
toward diversification in the United Kingdom and Germany and sug-
gested that such trends would continue.
Second, in order to move the contribution of this article beyond the
specifics of the New Zealand case, one further objective has been to
encourage wider insights by utilizing various methodologies, ranging
from “textual analysis” to interviews to the analysis of a critical case to
suggest a comprehensive research approach toward administrative
reform. We looked at different sites, ranging from overall MoG discus-
sions to change in the PSBs at the top of ministerial departments, to
change in the wider public sector, namely Crown Entities. All of these
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methods have their own limitations; nevertheless, we regard this as a
useful exercise that should encourage other scholars to complement
and challenge our analysis on New Zealand, and, more importantly,
cross-nationally.
Third, concepts such as NPM or post-NPM are academic inventions to
summarize wider empirical developments. For concepts to make a useful
contribution to the worlds of research and practice, the literatures need to
do better in terms of clarifying arguments. This article has attempted to do
so by going “back to basics,” by trying to identify some of the “essence”
that drives sets of doctrines, and then by exploring, through different
methodological lenses, the strength of claims made in the wider literature
in the light of one critical case, New Zealand. We acknowledge that rival
interpretations exist and invite challenge, but would emphasize that for
this debate to advance, the debate has to take place on the paths explored
here, namely, a clear definition of phenomena and the utilization of mul-
tiple methodologies. In short, if the literature wishes to continue to engage
with ambiguous terms, then it needs to do so in a more careful way to
allow for some degree of empirical relevance.
Notes
1. Indeed, the authors suggest that DEG offers a “perhaps unique opportunity
for self-sustaining change” (Dunleavy et al. 2005, 467).
2. http://www.ssc.govt.nz/display/document.asp?DocID=2776 (accessed
May 12, 2010).
3. Dunleavy et al. (2005) confuse the nature of a working paper that reflects the
view of an individual author with a more formal organizational view by the
SSC (with no named author). We solely focus on those documents that put
forward “policy advice” or represent organizational positions.
4. The SSC unsuccessfully opposed the Treasury-led drive for the establish-
ment of state-owned enterprises in 1984–1985.
5. The SSC issued a revised set of MoG principles after the 2008 election. It
included an emphasis on reduced state sector fragmentation and reduced
use of restructuring. However, the underlying administrative doctrines did
not reflect any major change; for example, questions regarding the use of
arm’s-length bodies were to be treated on a case-by-case basis: “[T]here
should be no a priori preference for splitting or joining funding and services
delivery roles so long as potential conflicts of interest can be managed
appropriately” (SSC 2008).
6. The interview codes reflect the date on which the interview was being held.
Bar one exception (a telephone interview), interviews were held in person
in Wellington. To protect anonymity, no departmental designations are
provided.
7. More broadly, the reforms amounted to a shift “down grid/down group” in
the sense of a reduced public service distinctiveness with each public service
department becoming the employer, the repeal of the public service manual
in toto, and the abolition of the unified public service. In addition, appoint-
ments were opened up to the private sector and to nonnationals.
8. The Statement of Intents were, by the late 2000s, widely regarded as little else
than “glossy and . . . public relations focused” exercises (Minister of Finance
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quoted in Gill 2008, 36) and the associated Managing for Outcomes initiative
is widely regarded by practitioners as “missing in action” (Gill 2008, 34).
9. Most prominently, the Christine Rankin case, where the chief executive,
highly successful according to a range of her performance measures, was
advised by the SSC that she would have to reapply for her position (in
competition with others) rather than being appointed for a second term. She
took the government to court, leading to embarrassing revelations regarding
statements made concerning her dress sense. She lost the court case but is
still regarded as a primary example for the importance of appointing chief
executives who understand “the rules of the game.”
10. For example, a reciprocal “statement of expectations and commitment to the
state sector” between chief executives and ministers that was signed by both
parties in March 2001 was not actively re-endorsed by ministers following
further elections.
11. Crown Entity is the New Zealand term for arm’s-length public bodies that
are not ministerial departments, or state-owned enterprises, or offices of
parliament. They are analogous to nondepartmental public bodies in the
United Kingdom or to agencies in Sweden (Gill 2002).
12. There were technical amendments to the Public Finance Act (PFA) including
incorporating the Fiscal Responsibility Act, new specific legislation relating
to Crown entities, and provisions to increase flexibility through mechanisms
such as multiclass output expense appropriations. There were also small
modifications to the State Sector Act (SSA) on leadership development,
extending the commissioner’s mandate in the wider state sector. Overall, the
broad principles and main provisions (of the PFA and the SSA) have sur-
vived largely unaltered since 1989 (Gill 2010).
13. Most prominently, the Tourism Board, the Fire Service Commission, the
Lottery Grants Commission, and the NZ Qualifications Authority. Incidents
related to inappropriate payments, the political nature of appointments, as
well as a “confused” relationship between ministers and crown entities.
14. More generally, organizational restructuring has been a continuous feature
in New Zealand over the last two decades. For example, a survey by the
Ethics Resources Centre (2007) (commissioned by the SSC) suggested that
48% of Crown Entity staff and 57% of departmental staff had experienced
restructuring over the previous two years.
15. So far, politicians have used the “whole of government” direction only
once—to require complementary e-government standards.
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Appendix
This paper represents the collaboration between two researchers with
different backgrounds (practitioner and academic). One (Gill) has consid-
erable experience as a senior public servant in New Zealand with direct
responsibility for leadership of public management issues and therefore
policy developments under consideration in this paper. The other (Lodge)
has a purely academic background in the subject. A number of key ethical
and methodological issues arise from this collaboration. First, the analysis
does not in any form reflect any official views represented by the New
Zealand government. Second, the actual work on this paper required some
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adjustments across all three sections: (1) In the section utilizing the
“administrative argument,” the documents provided by the SSC were
those identified as critical by Gill from his experience in the SSC. Lodge
and Gill independently coded the documents and then moderated the
results. (2) The section on “Public Service Bargains” utilizes interviews
conducted by Lodge. As Gill was not part of the interviews, and inter-
viewees were not aware that a former colleague would be involved in
utilizing the interview material, the section was written by Lodge alone.
(3) The Crown Entity Act work was led by Gill. He therefore has unique
insight into this episode, although, of course, there are particular biases
due to individual participation. We provide these comments not just to
increase transparency regarding this particular paper; this collaboration
raises wider research ethics issues for collaborative projects that involve
researchers with practitioner and purely academic backgrounds that have
rarely been discussed in the wider literature.
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